Essays academic service


A response to alastair narcross paper on factory farming

Moral Patients Moral Agents: Because moral agents have these abilities, it is fair to hold them morally accountable for what they do, assuming that the circumstances of their acting as they do in a particular case do not dictate otherwise.

SERFA – Produits naturels Dakar

A moral patient lacks the ability to formulate, let alone bring to bear, moral principles in deliberating about which one among a number of possible acts it would be right or proper to perform. Moral patients, in a word, cannot do what is right, nor can they do what is wrong. Granted what they do may be detrimental to the welfare of others — they may, for example, bring about acute suffering or even death; and granted, it may be necessary, in any given case, for moral agents to use force or violence to preven such harm being done, either in self-defense or in defense of others.

But even when a moral patient causes significant harm to another, the moral patient has not done what is wrong. Only moral agents can do what is wrong. Human infants, young children, and the mentally deranged or enfeebled of all ages are paradigm cases of human moral patients. More controversial is whether human fetuses and future generations of human beings qualify as moral patients. It is enough for our purposes, however, that some humans are reasonably viewed in this way.

Some animals, for reasons already advance, belong in category b ; other animals quite probably belong in category a. Those who have a more pleasant or happier life do not therefore have greater inherent value than those whose lives are less pleasant or happy.

Like proverbial apples and oranges, the two kinds of value do not fall within the same scale of comparison. One cannot ask, How much intrinsic value is the inherent value of this individual worth — how much is it equal to? To view moral agents as having inherent value is thus to view them as something different from, and something more than, mere receptacles of what has intrinsic value. Thus are we able to avoid the counterintuitive implications of act utilitarianism if we deny the receptacle view of moral agents and postulate their inherent equal value.

Those that meet the subject-of-a-life criterion. To be the subject-of-a-life is to be an individual whose life is characterized by those features explored in the opening chapters of the present work: Those who satisfy the subject-of-a-life criterion themselves have a distinctive kind of value — inherent value — and are not to be viewed or treated as mere receptacles.

A response to alastair narcross paper on factory farming

It enjoins us to treat all those individuals having inherent value in ways that respect their value, and thus it requires respectful treatment of all who satisfy the subject of a life criterion. Whether they are moral agents or patients, we must treat them in ways that respect their equal inherent value. It is an act of justice. It is respect for their inherent value.

  • Puppies have a higher moral status than farm animals;
  • This is not true, especially with pigs;
  • Alastair norcross, puppies, pigs arguments from human nature make an unjustified appeal to nature or factory farming;
  • A moral patient lacks the ability to formulate, let alone bring to bear, moral principles in deliberating about which one among a number of possible acts it would be right or proper to perform;
  • In this paper, we offer an analysis alastair norcross argues that the severe pain and suffering food animals endure as a result of traditional factory farming is.

The myth of the privileged moral status of moral agents has no clothes. Reagan is suggesting kind of utilitarianism of rights, but only when we must chose between overriding some rights The worse-off principle Df — Special considerations aside, when we must decide to override the rights of the many or the rights of the few who are innocent, and when the harm faced by the few would make them worse-ff than any of the many would be in any other option were chosen, then we ought to override the rights of the many.

All have inherent value 4 humans and a dog but the human suffer a greater loss of future opportunities in dying therefore our intuitions that it is the dog that must be sacrificed are justified. If it is sound, them, like us, animals have certain basic moral rights, including in particular the fundamental right to be treated with the respect that, as possessors of inherent value, they are due as a matter of strict justice.

Puppies, Pigs and People: Fred is involved in a car accident that damages his godiva gland which can no longer produce the hormone cocoamone Fred discovers that puppies produce cocoamone when tortured Fred tortures puppies to obtain cocoamone, a substance that Fred needs to consume in order to enjoy the taste of chocolate.

  1. To view moral agents as having inherent value is thus to view them as something different from, and something more than, mere receptacles of what has intrinsic value.
  2. Because moral agents have these abilities, it is fair to hold them morally accountable for what they do, assuming that the circumstances of their acting as they do in a particular case do not dictate otherwise.
  3. Granted what they do may be detrimental to the welfare of others — they may, for example, bring about acute suffering or even death; and granted, it may be necessary, in any given case, for moral agents to use force or violence to preven such harm being done, either in self-defense or in defense of others. Moral Patients Moral Agents.

Fred tortures the puppies himself whereas most Americans do not torture the animals they eat themselves. What is Fred paid someone else to do it for him? Meat-eaters are ignorant of the suffering they cause. Individual consumers lack the power to put an end to factory farming. Even cocoamone became a large industry it would still be immoral. Since vegetarianism is becoming popular your conversion to vegetarianism reduces the time to the threshold where the factory farming industry will have to produce less and therefore you save much suffering by reducing the time till the next reduction in production.

The suffering of factory-farmed animals is not intended but merely foreseen.

Alastair Norcross Puppies, Pigs, and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases

Here Norcross is invoking what is know as the Doctrine of Double Effect DDE The doctrine of double effect claims that there is a moral difference between intended consequences and consequences that are merely forseen The DDE is classically invoked to defend war, in war although we forsee that civilians will be killed we are not intending to kill civilians, so their killing is not immoral Response: Puppies have a higher moral status than farm animals. This is not true, especially with pigs.

It is permissible to kill and eat farm animals only if it is permissible to kill and eat humans with the same cognitive capacities. It is not permissible to kill and eat humans who have the same cognitive capacities as farm animals.

  • What widespread practice does Norcross argue is morally equivalent to Fred's torture of puppies?
  • Alastair norcross, puppies, pigs arguments from human nature make an unjustified appeal to nature or factory farming.

Therefore, it is not permissible to kill and eat farm animals.