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Taliban rejects us speculations of planned terrorist attacks

Taliban rejects us speculations of planned terrorist attacks

One of these alarms was of a reported threat against Air Force One itself, a threat eventually run down to a misunderstood communication in the hectic White House Situation Room that morning. President Bush reluctantly acceded to this advice and, at about 10: The immediate objective was to find a safe location-not too far away-where the President could land and speak to the American people.

The Secret Service was also interested in refueling the aircraft and paring down the size of the traveling party. The President's military aide, an Air Force officer, quickly researched the options and, sometime around 10: The motorcade consisted of a military police lead vehicle and a van; the proposed briefing theater had no phones or electrical outlets.

Staff scrambled to prepare another room for the President's remarks, while the lead Secret Service agent reviewed the security situation with superiors in Washington. The President completed his statement, which for security reasons was taped and not broadcast live, and the traveling party returned to Air Force One.

The next destination was discussed: Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska was chosen because of its elaborate command and control facilities, and because it could accommodate overnight lodging for 50 persons. The Secret Service wanted a place where the President could spend several days, if necessary. Contingency plans for the continuity of government and the evacuation of leaders had been implemented. Extraordinary security precautions were put in place at the nation's borders and ports.

Afghan Taliban Launches New Spring Offensive

In the late afternoon, the President overruled his aides' continuing reluctance to have him return to Washington and ordered Air Force One back to Andrews Air Force Base. He was flown by helicopter back to the White House, passing over the still-smoldering Pentagon. After emphasizing that the first priority was to help the injured and protect against any further attacks, he said: Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had returned from Peru after hearing of the attacks, joined the discussion.

They reviewed the day's events. It began with problems of how to help victims and stanch the flowing losses to the American economy, such as Organizing federal emergency assistance. One question was what kind of public health advice to give about the air quality in Lower Manhattan in the vicinity of the fallen buildings.

They evaluated legislative options, eventually setting up a federal compensation fund and defining the powers of a special master to run it. On the morning of September 13, the national airspace reopened for use by airports that met newly improvised security standards. Reopening the financial markets. After extraordinary emergency efforts involving the White House, the Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, aided by unprecedented cooperation among the usually competitive firms of the financial industry, the markets reopened on Monday, September 17.

Evaluating legislative proposals to bail out the airline industry and cap its liability. The very process of reviewing these issues underscored the absence of an effective government organization dedicated to assessing vulnerabilities and handling problems of protection and preparedness.

Though a number of agencies had some part of the task, none had security as its primary mission.

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By September 14,Vice President Cheney had decided to recommend, at least as a first step, a new White House entity to coordinate all the relevant agencies rather than tackle the challenge of combining them in a new department. Vice President Cheney reviewed the proposal with President Bush and other advisers. President Bush announced the new post and its first occupant- Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge-in his address to a joint session of Congress on September 20.

Eventually, 768 aliens were arrested as "special interest" detainees. Attorney General John Ashcroft told us that he saw his job in directing this effort as "risk minimization," both to find out who had committed the attacks and to prevent a subsequent attack.

Ashcroft ordered all special interest immigration hearings closed to the public, family members, and press; directed government attorneys to seek denial of bond until such time as they were "cleared" of terrorist connections by the FBI and other agencies; and ordered the identity of the detainees kept secret.

INS attorneys charged with prosecuting the immigration violations had trouble getting information about the detainees and any terrorist connections; in the chaos after the attacks, it was very difficult to reach law enforcement officials, who were following up on other leads. The clearance process approved by the Justice Department was time-consuming, lasting an average of about 80 days. Records indicate that 531 were deported, 162 were released on bond, 24 received some kind of immigration benefits, 12 had their proceedings terminated, and 8-one of whom was Moussaoui-were remanded to the custody of the U.

Guidelines on this subject issued in August 2001 by Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson essentially recapitulated prior guidance. Ashcroft told us he was determined to take every conceivable action, within the limits of the Constitution, to identify potential terrorists and deter additional attacks. First, we found no evidence that any flights of Saudi nationals, domestic or international, took place before the reopening of national airspace on the morning of September 13, 2001.

We found no evidence that anyone at the White House above the level of Richard Clarke participated in a decision on the departure of Saudi nationals. The issue came up in one of the many video teleconferences of the interagency group Clarke chaired, and Clarke said he approved of how the FBI was dealing with the matter when it came up for interagency discussion at his level.

And if they had no objections, it would be fine with me. The President and Vice President told us they were not aware of the issue at all until it surfaced much later in the media. None of the officials we interviewed recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from any political appointee.

Our own independent review of the Saudi nationals involved confirms that no one with known links to terrorism departed on these flights. Vice President Cheney described the President's mood as somber. When the larger meeting that included his domestic department heads broke up, President Bush chaired a smaller meeting of top advisers, a group he would later call his "war council.

In this restricted National Security Council meeting, the President said it was a time for self-defense. The United States would punish not just the perpetrators of the attacks, but also those who harbored them. Secretary Powell said the United States had to make it clear to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Arab states that the time to act was now. He said we would need to build a coalition. The President noted that the attacks provided a great opportunity to taliban rejects us speculations of planned terrorist attacks Russia and China.

Secretary Rumsfeld urged the President and the principals to think broadly about who might have harbored the attackers, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Sudan, and Iran. He wondered aloud how much evidence the United States would need in order to deal with these countries, pointing out that major strikes could take up to 60 days to assemble. In the first meeting, he stressed that the United States was at war with a new and different kind of enemy.

As they worked on defining the goals and objectives of the upcoming campaign, they considered a paper that went beyond al Qaeda to propose the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life," an aim that would include pursuing other international terrorist organizations in the Middle East.

The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone supporting al Qaeda would risk harm. The United States would need to integrate diplomacy, financial measures, intelligence, and military actions into an overarching strategy. The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against al Qaeda. They concluded that taliban rejects us speculations of planned terrorist attacks Pakistan decided not to help the United States, it too would be at risk.

Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps: The next day, the U. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions.

He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan against the Taliban. The President wanted the United States to strike the Taliban, step back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if they did not.

He made clear that the military should focus on targets that would influence the Taliban's behavior. It therefore detailed specific U. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to comply.

  1. None of the officials we interviewed recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from any political appointee.
  2. While American military commanders have since reported progress on the battlefield, the Taliban has responded by increasing attacks against Afghan security forces and making territorial gains.
  3. They evaluated legislative options, eventually setting up a federal compensation fund and defining the powers of a special master to run it.
  4. The conflict was pre-planned by banu bakr and they there are different speculations, why is islam the fastest growing religion in the us and the world.
  5. Vice President Cheney reviewed the proposal with President Bush and other advisers.

Therefore, State and Defense would plan to build an international coalition to go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO and other allies and request intelligence, basing, and other support from countries, according to their capabilities and resources. Finally, the plan detailed a public U. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view, amount to such a plan. Tenet described a plan for collecting intelligence and mounting covert operations. He proposed inserting CIA teams into Afghanistan to work with Afghan warlords who would join the fight against al Qaeda.

President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking.

  • They reviewed the day's events;
  • Abbas was the financing manager of the olympic terrorist attacks islamic attacks on the united states, speculations surrounding;
  • As of July 2004, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are still believed to be at large;
  • He proposed inserting CIA teams into Afghanistan to work with Afghan warlords who would join the fight against al Qaeda;
  • Copy of official us army disclaimer regarding this paper;
  • The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks.

It drew on the Infinite Resolve "phased campaign" plan the Pentagon had begun developing in November 2000 as an addition to the strike options it had been refining since 1998. But Shelton added a new element-the possible significant use of ground forces- and that is where President Bush reportedly focused his attention. Rice prepared a paper that President Bush then considered with principals on Monday morning, September 17. President Bush directed Secretary of State Powell to deliver an ultimatum to the Taliban along the lines that his department had originally proposed.

The State Department was also tasked to develop a plan to stabilize Pakistan and to be prepared to notify Russia and countries near Afghanistan when hostilities were imminent.

The President also tasked Rumsfeld to ensure that robust measures to protect American military forces against terrorist attack were implemented worldwide. Finally, he directed Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill to craft a plan to target al Qaeda's funding and seize its assets. Omar's response was "not negative on all these points.

It also incorporated the President's determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who harbor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary to end al Qaeda's sanctuary in Afghanistan.

The new directive-formally signed on October 25, after the fighting in Afghanistan had already begun-included new material followed by annexes discussing each targeted terrorist group. The old draft directive on al Qaeda became, in effect, taliban rejects us speculations of planned terrorist attacks first annex.

The goal was the "elimination of terrorism as a threat to our way of life. Iraq had been an enemy of the United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the United States was engaged in ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot, the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and some of the piloting, especially Hanjour's high-speed dive into the Pentagon.

He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide terrorists as well.

  • Afghanistan had been liberated from the rule of the Taliban;
  • Afghanistan had been liberated from the rule of the Taliban;
  • Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them;
  • The principals agreed that the overall message should be that anyone supporting al Qaeda would risk harm;
  • Vice President Cheney reviewed the proposal with President Bush and other advisers.

Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President told us he also thought about Iran. The memo found no "compelling case" that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks.

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It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer discussed in chapter 7 and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event.

Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein's regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons.

  • The clearance process approved by the Justice Department was time-consuming, lasting an average of about 80 days;
  • The President completed his statement, which for security reasons was taped and not broadcast live, and the traveling party returned to Air Force One.

The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites. He thought the U.